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We examine the eﬀectiveness of price caps to regulate imper- fectly competitive markets in which the 
demand is uncertain. To that eﬀect, we study a monopoly that makes irreversible ca- pacity 
investments ex-ante, and then chooses its output up to capacity upon observing the realization of 
demand. We show that the optimal price cap must trade oﬀ?the incentives for ca- pacity investment 
and capacity withholding, and is above the unit cost of capacity. Moreover, while a price cap provides 
in- centives for capacity investment and mitigates market power, it cannot eliminate ineﬃciencies. 
Capacity payments provide a useful complementary instrument. 
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0. Introduction
Since Littlechild (1983) ’s report, price cap regulation is regarded as an eﬀective in-
trument to mitigate market power, foster cost minimization, and ultimately enhance
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 of a binding price cap raises ﬁrms’ marginal revenue near the equilibrium output and
leads to an increase of the equilibrium output and surplus, and to a decrease of the mar-
ket price. Moreover, under broad regularity conditions on the demand and cost functions,
for any price cap above marginal cost both output and surplus decrease, and the market
price increases with the price cap. Further, in the most favorable conditions (e.g., when
ﬁrms produce the good with constant returns to scale), a price cap equal to marginal cost
is able to eliminate ineﬃciencies. (In contrast, rate-of-return regulation, used for most of
the 20th century to regulate public utilities, distorts incentives for cost minimization –
see, e.g., Joskow, 1972 – or cost reduction – see, e.g., Cabral and Riordan, 1989 .)
We study the eﬀectiveness of price cap regulation under demand uncertainty and
capacity precommitment and withholding. Demand uncertainty may be interpreted also
as variations of demand over time – see Green and Newbery (1992) for a discussion of this
interpretation in electricity markets. Capacity withholding is common in markets such
as sport events, hotel accommodation, agricultural products, or electricity. In markets
for agricultural products, farmer associations sometimes destroy part of the output. In
electricity markets ﬁrms may declare some of their generators to be unavailable – data for
the California electricity market during the time p erio d May 2000-December 2001 show
that at the price cap some generators did not supply all of their uncommitted capacity
– see Cramton (2003) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) .
It is easy to show that in the absence of capacity precommitment, e.g., when the go o d
can be produced instantly upon the realization of demand or there is slack capacity, the
eﬀectiveness of price caps and their comparative static properties with respect to the ex-
p ected output, exp ected price, and exp ected surplus remain the same as when the demand
is deterministic. The only eﬀect of uncertainty is smoothing the non-diﬀerentiability at
the lowest non-binding price cap arising when the demand is deterministic. In particular,
a price cap equal to marginal cost maximizes the expected surplus. The intuition of these
results is analogous to that of the deterministic demand case – see Lemus and Moreno
(2015) . The analysis of this case is relevant for, e.g., the Spanish or California electricity
markets, in which ﬁrms have excess capacity (at least in recent times), and their bids are
short lived (ﬁrms compete to serve the demand for only hourly or half hourly p erio ds).
Of course, price cap regulation has an impact on ﬁrms’ capacity investments, which are
long run decisions made prior to the realization of demand. Thus, endogenizing ﬁrms’
capacity investment decisions seems a natural next step to take.
In order to tackle this issue, we consider a setting in which a monopoly makes irre-
versible capacity investments ex-ante, and then chooses its output up to capacity upon
observing the realization of demand. Thus, the monopoly may withhold capacity if it is
beneﬁcial to do so. In this setting, ineﬃciencies arise both because the monopoly installs
a low level of capacity in order to precommit to high prices, and because the monopoly
withholds capacity for low demand realizations in order to keep prices from falling too
much.
Focusing on the monopolistic case allows us to avoid some potential conundrums that
arise in oligopolistic settings, which are distractions from the issue under scrutiny – the2
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ampact of price cap regulation. For example, it is unclear what is the appropriate model of
ompetition to consider at the ex-post stage. Moreover, when demand is uncertain there
re well known diﬃculties therein to guarantee existence, uniqueness and symmetry of
quilibrium – see, e.g., Reynolds and Wilson (2000) , Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) .
The eﬀects of price cap regulation with demand uncertainty and capacity precom-
itment and withholding are subtle. We show that, much as in the absence of capacity
recommitment, the introduction of a suﬃciently large binding price cap raises the ﬁrms’
arginal return to capacity investment near the equilibrium capacity and leads to an in-
rease of the equilibrium capacity, the expected output and the expected total surplus,
nd to a decrease of the expected market price. However, price caps near the unit cost
f capacity are sub optimal b ecause they reduce the return to capacity investment below
ts cost, and lead the monopoly to install no capacity.
The optimal price cap (i.e., the price cap that maximizes surplus) must trade oﬀ the
ncentives for capacity investment (a dynamic eﬃciency eﬀect) and capacity withholding
a static eﬃciency eﬀect), and tends to be well above the unit cost of capacity. When
he unit cost of capacity is high, the dynamic eﬀect on capacity investment is a ﬁrst
rder eﬀect, while the static eﬀect on capacity withholding is a second order eﬀect. Thus,
n this case the optimal price cap maximizes capacity investment. When the unit cost
f capacity is low, however, near the price cap that maximizes capacity investment the
ynamic eﬀect on capacity investment is a second order eﬀect, while the static eﬀect on
apacity withholding is a ﬁrst order eﬀect. Thus, in this case reducing the price cap below
he level that maximizes capacity investment increases expected surplus, and therefore
he optimal price cap does not maximize capacity investment.
The comparative static properties of price caps are complex: the eﬀect of a change
f the price cap on expected output and expected surplus depend on the magnitudes
f the static eﬀect (on withholding) and the dynamic eﬀect (on capacity investment),
hich may have opposite signs. Under standard regularity assumptions on the demand
istribution, capacity investment is a single peaked function of the price cap: for low
rice caps capacity investment increases with the price cap until it reaches a maximum
t some binding price cap r ∗, and then decreases with the price cap above r ∗. When
he unit cost of capacity is large the signs of the eﬀects of changes in the price cap on
xp ected output, exp ected surplus and capacity investment coincide. Interestingly, when
he unit cost of capacity is small, expected output and expected surplus decrease with
he price cap above and around r ∗, and thus the optimal price cap is below r ∗. Price
aps aﬀect the market price directly, but also indirectly via their impact on the level
f capacity. Thus, an increase of the price cap increases the expected price above and
round r ∗, but has an ambiguous eﬀect below r ∗.
Introducing a suﬃciently large binding price cap enhances the incentives for capacity
nvestment and discourages capacity withholding. Nonetheless, a price cap alone is unable
o provide the appropriate incentives for capacity investment and simultaneously elimi-
ate the ineﬃciencies arising from capacity withholding: the optimal price cap induces
 low level of capacity, and does not prevent capacity withholding. Hence, with demand3
  
 
 
 uncertainty and capacity precommitment an optimal regulatory policy may require using
other instruments.
While a full analysis of complementary instruments available to reduce ineﬃciencies is
outside the scope of the present paper, we study the impact of capacity payments, which
have been used in, e.g., electricity markets. We show that when the cost of capacity is
large, introducing a small capacity payment, and accommodating accordingly the optimal
price cap, increases the surplus. (Signing the eﬀect of capacity payments when the cost
of capacity is small seems diﬃcult.) The eﬀect of capacity payments is further illustrated
in the examples in Section 6 , in which we evaluate the impact on equilibrium of a small
capacity payment combined with an optimal reduction the price cap: relative to the
equilibrium arising with only an optimal price cap, in this equilibrium there is more
capacity investment and less withholding and, consequently, the expected output and
surplus are larger – see Figs. 5 and 6 .
Our assumption that demand is linear and subject to an additive shock is restrictive,
although it is common in the literature. However, our main conclusions seem to hold
more generally. For example, we obtain analogous results with a multiplicative, uniformly
distributed demand shock.
Earle et al. (2007) studies an oligopolistic model in which ﬁrms make output deci-
sions ex-ante, i.e., ﬁrms cho ose their output b efore the realization of demand and supply
it inelastically and unconditionally. In this setting, they show that for price caps near
marginal cost the output is suboptimally low and may increase with the price cap. More-
over, they establish that the comparative static properties of price caps that hold when
the demand is deterministic fail for a generic stochastic demand schedule. (The source of
this result is not demand uncertainty per se , but quantity precommitment, which is as-
sumed in the model.) Grimm and Zoettl (2010) establish that under standard regularity
assumptions the comparative static properties of price caps are recovered. (Also, Grimm
and Zoettl, 2010 consider a setting in which ﬁrms may withhold capacity, but do not
study the trade-oﬀs of capacity investment and withholding, and mistakenly conclude
that maximizing the expected surplus amounts to maximizing capacity.) In a similar set- 
ting, Reynolds and Rietzke (2012) study the impact of price caps in oligopolistic markets
with endogenous entry, and identify conditions under which a price cap improves welfare.
Other authors have studied the dynamic eﬀects of price cap regulation. Dixit
(1991) studies a competitive market in which the demand is uncertain and ﬁrms make
ex-ante irreversible investments, and shows that price caps delay investments and lead to
higher prices over time. Biglaiser and Riordan (2000) show that in the presence of exoge-
nous technological progress price caps provide better incentives for capacity investment
and replacement than rate-of-return regulation. Dobbs (2004) studies the intertemporal
eﬀect of an optimal price cap on the size and timing of the investments of a monopoly
that faces an uncertain demand, and shows that it leads to under investment and quan-
tity rationing – Roques and Savva (2009) obtain similar conclusions in an oligopolistic
extension of this setting. Also, consistent with our results, Dobbs (2004) shows that a
price cap is an eﬀective instrument when the unit cost of capacity is small relative to the4
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ponsumers’ willingness to pay (or the demand rate or growth), than when it is large. As
n our setting, these models assume constant return to scale. However, they do not allow
or capacity withholding.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our model and derive
reliminary results. In Section 3 we study the comparative static properties of price
aps. In Section 4 we study optimal price caps. In Section 5 we discuss the usefulness
f capacity payments. In Section 6 we apply our analysis to a simple example, which
rovides clear illustration of our ﬁndings. The Appendix contains the proofs.
. The model
Consider a monopoly facing an uncertain demand given for p ∈ R + by D( X, p ) =
ax { X − p, 0 } , where X is a continuous random variable with c.d.f. and p.d.f. denoted by
 and f , resp ectively. The monop oly must decide how much capacity to install, k ∈ R + ,
efore the demand is realized. The cost of installing a unit of capacity is a positive
onstant c > 0. Once capacity is installed the go o d can b e pro duced with constant
eturns to scale up to capacity. We assume without loss of generality that the production
ost is zero. The monopoly decides its output upon observing the realization of demand,
nd may withhold capacity if doing so is beneﬁcial.
In order to rule out trivial cases in which the monopoly installs no capacity we assume
hat E ( X) > c. Also we reduce notation by assuming that the support of X is the interval
0, 1]. Under this assumption the consumers’ willingness to pay is always above the
ost of production, which implies that the equilibrium price is a well-deﬁned random
ariable. This facilitates presenting and interpreting our results, but entails a small loss
f generality.
Suppose that a regulatory agency imposes a price cap r ∈ [0 , 1] . In order to identify the
onopoly’s capacity choice k ∗( r ), we proceed by backward induction to identify ﬁrst the
onopoly’s output Q ( r , k , X ), and the market price P ( r , k , X ). Since the cost of capacity
s sunk and the cost of production up to capacity is zero, then at the stage of output choice
he monopoly maximizes revenue. We note that levels of capacity k > max { 1 − r, 1 / 2 } are
ub optimal: If the monop oly was not capacity constrained, then its output for x ∈ [0 , 1]
ould be x /2 ≤ 1/2 if x /2 ≤ r , and it would be x − r ≤ 1 − r if x /2 > r . Hence if k >
ax { 1 − r, 1 / 2 } , then the monopoly would maintain idling capacity, and therefore since
 > 0 it would be able to increase its proﬁt by installing less capacity. Thus, we restrict
ttention to price cap-capacity pairs ( r, k) ∈ [0 , 1] 2 such that k ≤ max { 1 − r, 1 / 2 } .
Fig. 1 describes a partition of the set of relevant price cap-capacity pairs into three
egions, A = { ( r, k) ∈ [0 , 1] 2 | r ≤ k ≤ 1 − r} , B = { ( r, k) ∈ [0 , 1] 2 | k < min { 1 − r, r}} ,
nd C = { ( r, k) ∈ [0 , 1] 2 | 1 − r ≤ k ≤ 1 / 2 } . We calculate the equilibrium price and out-
ut in regions A , B , and C for each realization of the demand parameter X . In all three
egions the monopoly equilibrium emerges for low demand realizations x ∈ [0 , 2 r) . How-
ver, as we consider larger realizations of the demand parameter, while in region A the
rice cap becomes binding (i.e., the monopoly equilibrium price is above the price cap)5
Fig. 1. Relevant price cap-capacity pairs. before the capacity is fully utilized, in region B capacity binds before the price cap does.
In region C the price cap never binds.
Table A describes the prices and outputs for ( r , k ) ∈ A .
Table A 
Equilibrium output and price for ( r , k ) ∈ A . 
X [0, 2 r ) [2 r, r + k) [ r + k, 1] 
P ( r , k , x ) x /2 r r 
Q ( r , k , x ) x /2 x − r k 
Fig. 2 illustrates the results in Table A . For low demand realizations (such as x 0 <
2 r in Fig. 2 ), the price cap is non-binding, and the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium
arises. For intermediate demand realizations (such as x 1 ∈ (2 r, r + k) in Fig. 2 ) the price
cap binds, and the monopoly serves the demand at the price cap, x 1 − r. (Note that
marginal revenue becomes negative for output levels greater than x 1 − r < k.) Thus, for
intermediate demand realizations a marginal decrease of the price cap leads to an increase
of output. For high demand realizations (such as x 2 > r + k in Fig. 2 ) the marginal
revenue remains equal to r > 0 even if the monopoly serves its entire capacity. Hence the
monopoly serves its entire capacity k , and the demand x 2 − r > k is rationed.
Note the main features of equilibrium for price cap-capacity pairs in region A : the
monopoly withholds capacity except for high demand realizations, the demand is rationed
only for high demand realizations, and the market price P ( r , k , x ) is independent of the
level of installed capacity k . Increasing capacity aﬀects the revenue only for high demand
realizations x > r + k for which the monopoly supplies its entire capacity. For these
demand realizations the price cap r is binding. Thus, the expected revenue increases by
r times the probability that the additional marginal unit of capacity is supplied, i.e., the
expected marginal revenue to capacity is r[1 − F ( r + k)] – see the proof of Lemma 1 in
the Appendix .6
Fig. 2. The eﬀect of a price cap when ( r , k ) ∈ A . 
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able B 
quilibrium output and price for ( r , k ) ∈ B . 
X [0, 2 k ) [2 k , r + k ) [ r + k, 1] 
P ( r , k , x ) x /2 x − k r 
Q ( r , k , x ) x /2 k k 
Fig. 3 illustrates the results in Table B . For low demand realizations (such as x 0 <
 k in Fig. 3 ) the price cap is not binding, and the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium
rises. For intermediate demand realizations (such as x 1 ∈ (2 k , r + k ) in Fig. 3 ), marginal
evenue remains positive even when the monopoly serves its full capacity, and the price
hat clears the market when the monopoly serves its full capacity is below the price cap.
hus, the monopoly serves its full capacity and the price cap is non-binding. For high
emand realizations (such as x 3 > r + k in Fig. 3 ) marginal revenue remains positive
ven when the monopoly serves its full capacity, but the price that clears the market
s above the price cap. Thus, the monopoly serves its full capacity and the price-cap is
inding.
Note the main features of equilibrium for price cap-capacity pairs in region B : the
onopoly withholds capacity only for low demand realizations, the demand is rationed
nly for high demand realizations, and the market price P ( r , k , x ) depends on the level
f capacity. Changes in the price cap aﬀect the output for intermediate and high demand
ealizations, and the market price for high demand realizations.7
Fig. 3. The eﬀect of a price cap when ( r , k ) ∈ B . 
 Table C describes the prices and output for ( r , k ) ∈ C .
Table C 
Equilibrium output and price for ( r , k ) ∈ C . 
X [0, 2 k ) [2 k , 1] 
P ( r , k , x ) x /2 x − k
Q ( r , k , x ) x /2 k 
In region C the price cap is never binding. The monopoly withholds capacity only for
low demand realizations, x ∈ [0 , 2 k) , and supplies its entire capacity otherwise. Demand
is never rationed. The market price P ( r , k , x ) depends on capacity.
We study the monopoly’s capacity choice. Given ( r , k ) the monopoly revenue is
R( r, k, X) = P ( k, r, X) Q ( r, k, X) ,
and its expected proﬁt is
Π¯( r, k) = E ( R( r, k, X) ) − ck.
Clearly Π¯ is continuous on A ∪ B ∪ C .
Using the results described in Tables A –C we readily calculate the monopoly’s ex-
pected proﬁt, and verify that the expected marginal revenue to capacity, M R ( r, k) =
∂ E ( R( r, k, X) ) /∂ k, is decreasing in k , and is diﬀerentiable on A ∪ B ∪ C – see the proof of
Lemma 1 in the Appendix . Note that while in region A a marginal increase of capacity
increases revenue only for high demand realizations (i.e., for x > r + k), in regions B and
C a marginal increase of capacity increases revenue for high and intermediate demand
realizations (i.e., for x > 2 k ).8
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LIn equilibrium, the monopoly’s capacity k ∗( r ) maximizes Π¯( r, ·) . Thus, since Π¯( r, ·) is a
wice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave function for all r ∈ [0 , 1] , k ∗( r) = 0 if M R ( r, 0) <
, and otherwise k ∗( r ) is the unique solution of the equation
M R ( r, k) = c. (1)
oreover, the Maximum Theorem implies that k ∗ is a continuous function. We summarize
hese results in Lemma 1 .
emma 1. For all r ∈ [0 , 1] , Π¯( r, ·) is a twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave function,
nd hence the equilibrium capacity k ∗( r ) is a continuous function.
Calculating the equilibrium capacity is somewhat involved. Obviously, the equilibrium
apacity is zero for price caps below the unit cost of capacity c . Hence, price caps near
he unit cost of capacity are suboptimal. Moreover, it is easy to see that the equilibrium
apacity is also zero for price caps r above but near the unit cost of capacity: because
he probability of demand realizations x < c is positive, for r above but near c the
xpected marginal revenue is below c even for k = 0 . Therefore installing capacity entails
osses. Thus, the equilibrium capacity is zero unless the price cap is suﬃciently high
hat expected marginal revenue for levels of capacity near zero is greater than c , i.e., r
r ( c ), where r ( c ) is the unique solution to the equation M R ( r, 0) = c. (If the lower
ound of the support of X is α > c , instead of zero as we have assumed, then for r = c
he expected marginal revenue is c and proﬁts are zero for k ∈ [0 , α − c ] , whereas proﬁts
re negative for k > α − c. Hence the equilibrium capacity may b e p ositive, and may
ncrease or decrease with r near the unit cost of capacity depending of the distribution
f demand.)
Obviously, suﬃciently large price caps are non-binding. Speciﬁcally, the largest binding
rice cap r¯ ( c ) is the unique solution to the equation c = M R ( r, 1 − r) . For r ≥ r¯ ( c ) the
rice cap is not binding, and ( r , k ∗( r )) is in region C . We denote by k C the equilibrium
apacity, i.e., solution to the Eq. (1) , when the price cap is not binding.
Intermediate price caps r ∈ [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) aﬀect the equilibrium capacity in more complex
ays. The equilibrium capacity as a function of the price cap, k ∗( r ), diﬀers depending
n whether ( r , k ∗( r )) is in region A or B . The solution to Eq. (1) in region A is k A ( r) =
 
−1 (1 − c/r) − r. The solution to Eq. (1) in region B , k B ( r ), cannot be obtained in
losed form. We show that k ∗( r) = k A ( r) for price caps such that M R ( r, r) ≥ c, and that
 
∗( r) = k B ( r) otherwise.
When the hazard rate of X is increasing, then for c ≤ M ∗ := max r∈ [0 , 1 / 2] M R ( r, r) ,
 R ( r, r) ≥ c on an interval [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , where r −( c ) and r + ( c ) are the smaller and
arger solutions to the equation M R ( r, r) = c, and satisfy r ( c ) < r −( c ) < r + ( c ) < r¯ ( c ) .
ence under this assumption the equilibrium capacity is zero below r ( c ), k B ( r )
n [ r ( c ) , r −( c )) , k A ( r ) on [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , k B ( r ) on ( r + ( c ) , ¯r ( c )] , and k C above r¯ ( c ) .
emma 2 states these results precisely.9
 Lemma 2. The equilibrium capacity is k ∗( r) = 0 if r ∈ [0 , r ( c )) , and it is k ∗( r) = k C
if r ∈ [ ¯r ( c ) , 1] . For r ∈ [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) , k ∗( r) = k A ( r) if M R ( r, r) ≥ c , and k ∗( r) = k B ( r)
otherwise; moreover, if the hazard rate ofXis increasing, then M R ( r, r) ≥ c holds on a
subinterval of ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) whenc ≤ M ∗, and does not hold otherwise.
Using the results in Tables A –C , and the description on the equilibrium capacity
given in Lemma 2 , we can calculate the expected output and market price as well as the
expected surplus, thus providing a complete description of the monopoly equilibrium. In
Section 6 we solve an example in which X in uniformly distributed.
3. Comparative statics
In this section we study the comparative static properties of price caps when the
hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. f is diﬀerentiable. We ﬁrst show that under
these regularity assumptions on the distribution of demand the equilibrium capacity k ∗
is a single peaked function of the price cap r on ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) . Thus, the comparative static
properties of the equilibrium capacity are analogous to those price caps have on expected
output when capacity has no precommitment value.
It is easy to see that in our setting when capacity lacks precommitment value (i.e.,
when it can be built instantly), regardless of whether or not the hazard rate of X is
increasing and/or f is diﬀerentiable, the expected output (which is equal to capacity) is
zero when the price cap r is below c , has an upward discontinuity at r = c, at which
point reaches its maximum value, and decreases smo othly with r ab ove c – see Lemus
and Moreno (2015) . We show that with capacity precommitment capacity is zero for
r ∈ [0 , r ( c )) , where r ( c ) > c , then increases with r until it reaches its maximum value
on ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) ), and then decreases with r until the price cap becomes non-binding at
r¯ ( c ) , remaining constant above r¯ ( c ) . These general features are illustrated in Figs. 5 and
6 of Section 6 in which we oﬀer graphs of these functions for an example in which X is
uniformly distributed. We shall see that expected output and surplus behave analogously.
We state these results in Proposition 1 . The proofs of these results, which are standard,
involve implicitly diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization – see
the Appendix .
Proposition 1. Assume that the hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. is diﬀer-
entiable. Then k ∗( ·) is a diﬀerentiable single peaked function on ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) ; i.e., k ∗( ·)
has a maximum at some r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) , and dk ∗( r )/ dr > 0 on ( r ( c ), r ∗( c )) where as
dk ∗( r )/ dr < 0 on ( r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )) .
Next, we discuss the eﬀects of changes in the price cap on the expected output and
the expected price. The expected output is readily calculated using the results described
in Tables A –C . In region A , the monopoly maintains idling capacity for intermediate
demand realizations in which the price cap is binding. Thus, in region A the expected10
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eutput strictly decreases with the price cap given the level of capacity. Since for price caps
 ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the equilibrium capacity k ∗ satisﬁes ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ A , then the expected
utput decreases on [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] provided the equilibrium capacity does not decrease,
.e.,
dk ∗
dr 
≤ 0 ⇒ d E ( Q ( r, k 
∗( r) , X) 
dr 
< 0 .
ence when the price cap that maximizes capacity r ∗( c ) is in the interval [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] ,
he expected output decreases with the price cap on [r ∗( c ) , r + ( c )] . Therefore the price
ap that maximizes output is below r ∗( c ) since, as the proof of Proposition 2 given in
he Appendix shows, near r ∗( c ) a decrease of the price cap has only a second order eﬀect
n capacity, while it has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on demand via price reduction.
In region B , however, the output does not dependent directly on the price cap, but
nly indirectly via its impact on the equilibrium level of capacity. Thus, for price caps
 ∈ [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , for which ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ B , the signs of the eﬀects of changes
n the price cap on expected output and capacity are the same, i.e.,
d E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
 0 ⇔ dk
∗
dr 
 0 .
Let us discuss the eﬀect of changes in the price cap on the expected price. In region
 the market price is independent of k , and therefore a change in the price cap only has
 direct (positive) eﬀect on P . Hence the expected market price increases with the price
ap regardless of its impact on capacity. Since ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ A for r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then
d E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
> 0
n [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] . In region B , however, the market price depends on k , and therefore a
hange in the price cap has an indirect eﬀect on the market price via its impact on the
evel of capacity, as well as a direct (positive) eﬀect. When this indirect eﬀect is also
ositive, i.e., when dk ∗/ dr < 0, then the total eﬀect is positive, but when the indirect
ﬀect is negative, the sign of the total eﬀect is ambiguous. Since ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ B for
 ∈ [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then
dk ∗
dr 
≤ 0 ⇒ d E ( P ( r, k 
∗( r) , X)
dr 
> 0 .
herefore
d E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X) 
dr 
> 0
n [ r ( c ), r ∗( c )). However, the sign of this derivative on ( r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )] is ambiguous. Obvi-
usly, changes in the price cap on [0 , r ( c )) ∪ ( ¯r ( c ) , 1] have no eﬀect on the expected price.
e summarize these results in Proposition 2 .
roposition 2. Assume that the hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. is diﬀer-
ntiable. If r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r −( c ) , r + ( c )) , then the expected output decreases with the price cap11
above and aroundr ∗( c ) ; otherwise the expected output increases with the price cap on ( r
( c ), r ∗( c )) and decreases on ( r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )) . Moreover, the expected price increases with the
price cap on [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] ∪ [r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )) .
Proposition 2 reveals that with demand uncertainty and capacity precommitment the
comparative static properties of price caps are somewhat complex. In particular, when c
is small the capacity maximizing price cap r ∗( c ) does not maximize the expected output:
decreasing the price cap below r ∗( c ) leads to an increase of the expected output even
though installed capacity decreases. Of course, this fact has direct implications on the
price cap that maximizes the expected surplus, as we shall see in the next section.
4. Optimal price caps
A regulator who wants to maximize the expected surplus using a price cap as its
single instrument, and cannot force the monopoly to serve its full capacity, must trade
oﬀ the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding, and must account
for the cost of installing capacity (some of which may be seldom utilized). Thus, the
optimal price cap may diﬀer from the price cap that maximizes capacity investment
r ∗( c ). Indeed, we show that when the unit cost of capacity is small the optimal price
cap is below r ∗( c ): For price caps near r ∗( c ) reducing the price cap has a ﬁrst order
positive eﬀect on surplus by discouraging capacity withholding, and only a second order
negative eﬀect on surplus by diminishing the incentives for capacity investment. When
the unit cost of capacity is high, however, the price cap aﬀects surplus only via its impact
on capacity investment, and thus the optimal price cap is r ∗( c ). (Hence when capacity
cannot be withheld, as in the model of Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and Zoettl (2010) ,
maximizing the expected surplus simply amounts to maximizing capacity.) Obviously a
price cap aﬀects the distribution of surplus also. A regulator who wants to maximize the
consumer surplus, for example, would choose as well a price cap below r ∗( c ) when the
cost of capacity is low.
Denote by S ( r , k , X ) the equilibrium gross surplus (i.e., the surplus ignoring the cost of
capacity) as a function of the price cap, capacity, and demand realization. Following the
literature, we simplify somewhat the problem by assuming eﬃcient rationing, i.e., when
demand is rationed the consumers with the largest willingness to pay receive priority to
buy the go o d. See Tables 3A and 3BC in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix .
The expected surplus is
S¯ ( r, k) := E ( S( r, k, X)) − ck.
An optimal price cap maximizes S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) on [0, 1].
As Table A above shows, for ( r , k ) ∈ A the monopoly withholds capacity for demand
realizations in the interval [0 , r + k) , and therefore the expected gross surplus depends
directly on the price cap, as well as indirectly through its eﬀect on capacity. When ( r ,
k ) ∈ B ∪ C , however, the price cap has no direct eﬀect on the expected gross surplus,12
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tut only has an indirect eﬀect via its inﬂuence on capacity – see Tables B and C . These
bservations are made precise by diﬀerentiating S¯ , to obtain
d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r))
dr 
= s ( r ) I [ r −( c ) ,r + ( c )] ( r ) + 
dk ∗( r )
dr 
( ∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
( x − k ∗( r )) f ( x ) dx − c
)
, (2)
here I is the indicator function, and s ( r) = −r[F ( r + k ∗( r) ) − F ( 2 r ) ] . (See the proof of
roposition 3 in the Appendix .)
For r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the two terms in the expression (2) identify the direct and
ndirect eﬀects on surplus, respectively, of changes in r . Since ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ A , then k ∗( r) =
 A ( r) > r, and therefore the sing of the direct eﬀect is negative, i.e., s ( r ) < 0. Moreover, if
 ∈ [r −( c ) , r ∗( c )] , then dk ∗( r )/ dr ≤ 0, i.e., the indirect eﬀect is also negative, and therefore
he total eﬀect is negative, i.e., d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r)) /dr < 0 . Hence the expected surplus decreases
ith the price cap at r ∗( c ): Even though decreasing the price cap below r ∗( c ) decreases
apacity, it discourages capacity withholding and increases surplus. Thus, the optimal
rice cap is below r ∗( c ).
For r ∈ [0 , 1] \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the ﬁrst term in (2) is zero: Changes in the price cap have
nly an indirect eﬀect on surplus via their impact on capacity investment, and the sign
f d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r )) /dr is that of dk ∗( r )/ dr . Thus, when r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the
ptimal price cap is r ∗( c ) – see the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix .
Proposition 3 summarizes these results.
roposition 3. Assume that hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. is diﬀerentiable.
f r ∗( c ) ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] then the expected surplus decreases with the price cap above and
round r ∗( c ) , whereas if r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then r ∗( c ) maximizes the ex-
ected surplus.
. Capacity payments
In the absence of capacity precommitment a price cap equal to the unit cost of capacity
liminates all ineﬃciencies. With capacity precommitment, however, the optimal price
ap has to trade oﬀ the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding, and
annot eliminate ineﬃciencies: as we show, capacity investment is inadequately low and
nderused.
In order to see this, we calculate the surplus realized when k ∈ [0 , 1] units of capacity
re installed and supplied unconditionally, denoted by S ∗, which is given by
S ∗( k) = 12
∫ k
0 
x 2 f ( x ) dx + 12
∫ 1
k
(2 x − k) kf ( x ) dx − ck.
iﬀerentiating S ∗ yields d 2 S ∗( k ) /dk 2 = −[1 − F ( k)] < 0 . Hence S ∗ is a concave function,
nd since it is increasing near k = 0 , the socially optimal capacity, denoted by k W , solves
he equation dS ∗( k) /dk = 0 .13
Proposition 4 establishes that an optimal price cap alone fails to provide incentives
to install the optimal level of capacity; that is, k W > k ∗( r ∗( c )). In addition, price caps
alleviate, but do not eliminate the ineﬃciencies arising from capacity withholding. Of
course, taking control of the ﬁrm, and then installing and supplying unconditionally k W
units would eliminate ineﬃciencies. However, such intervention likely involves a large
subsidy with a prohibitively large opportunity cost, be it in terms of the distortions
created in raising such revenue, or in terms of the beneﬁts of its alternative use.
Investment adequacy is a traditional theme of the literature on market regulation.
This literature regards capacity payments as a useful instrument to restore investment
adequacy. In the electricity industry, for example, capacity markets have been introduced
in the US, Central and South America and, more recently, the United Kingdom. Also,
Sweden and Finland incentivize strategic reserves, and Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland
provide capacity subsidies – Joskow (2006) and Briggs and Kleit (2013) study of the
impact of capacity subsidies in competitive electricity markets.
Let us then examine the impact on the social surplus of a marginal capacity payment
combined with a price cap set up to maximize the surplus. A capacity payment z amounts
to reducing the cost of capacity to the monopoly from c to c − z. Let us denote by
˜ k ∗( r, z) the monopoly’s capacity choice with a price cap r ∈ [0 , 1] and a capacity payment
z ∈ [0 , c ] , and by ˜ r∗( z) the price cap that maximizes the expected surplus, ˜ S ( r, z) , which
is given by
˜ S ( r, z) = E ( S( r, ˜  k ∗( r, z) , X)) − c ˜  k ∗( r, z) .
In Proposition 4 we show that when the cost of capacity is large introducing a small
capacity payment increases surplus. We establish this result by evaluating d ˜  S ( ˜  r∗( z ) , z ) /dz
and showing that is positive near z = 0 – see the Appendix . The sign of this derivative is
unclear when the cost of capacity is small. In the example discussed in the next section,
however, a small capacity payment has a positive impact on surplus both when the cost
of capacity is large and when it is small.
Proposition 4. Assume that hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. is diﬀerentiable.
Then the equilibrium capacity with an optimal price cap alone is below the optimal level
of capacity k W . Moreover, if the cost of capacity is large, i.e., the optimal price cap
maximizes capacity, then a marginal capacity payment increases the net surplus and the
installed capacity.
6. An example
Assume that X is uniformly distributed. Hence its p.d.f., which is given by f ( x ) = 1 ,
is diﬀerentiable, and its hazard rate, h ( x ) = (1 − x ) −1 , is increasing. Since E ( X) = 1 / 2 ,
we consider values of the unit costs of capacity c ∈ (0, 1/2).14
Fig. 4. Equilibrium capacity. 
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iWe calculate the equilibrium capacity. By Proposition 1 ,
k A ( r) = F −1
(
1 − c
r 
)
− r = 1 − c
r 
− r.
he expected marginal revenue is M R ( r, k) = ( k 2 + 2 ( 1 − 2 k ) r − r 2 ) / 2 in region B , and
 R ( r, k) = ( 1 − 2 k ) 2 / 2 in region C – see Eqs. (4) and (5) in the proof of Lemma 1 in
he Appendix . Solving Eq. (1) yields
k B ( r) = 2 r −
√ 
2 c − r ( 2 − 5 r ) , and k C =
(
1 −
√ 
2 c
)
/ 2 .
The function r , which is the solution to the equation c = M R ( r, 0) = r ( 2 − r ) / 2 , is
 ( c ) = 1 − √ 1 − 2 c . The functions r − and r + , which are the smaller and larger so-
utions to the equation c = M R ( r, r) = r(1 − 2 r) , are readily calculated as r ±( c ) =
1 ± √ 1 − 8 c ) / 4 . These functions are well deﬁned for c ∈ (0, M ∗), where M ∗ = 1 / 8 . (For
 ≥ 1/8 the equation has no solution on [0, 1], i.e., the interval [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] is empty.)
he function r¯ , which is the solution to equation c = M R ( r, 1 − r) = ( 1 − 2 r ) 2 / 2 , is
¯ ( c ) = (1 + 
√ 
2 c ) / 2 .
Fig. 4 provides a description of the function k ∗( r ) for c ∈ (0, 1/2). For c ≤ 1/9 the equi-
ibrium capacity k ∗( r ) reaches its maximum at the price cap r ∗A = 
√ 
c ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] . For
 > 1/9, the equilibrium capacity k ∗( r ) reaches its maximum at r ∗B = (1 + 2 
√ 
10 c − 1 ) / 5 ∈
 r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] . Interestingly, for c ∈ (1/9, 1/8) the equilibrium capacity k ∗( r ) is
ncreasing in the interval ( r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , and reaches its maximum at r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r + ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) .
The expected surplus is S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) = 0 on [0, r ( c )),
S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) = r 2 ( 4 − 9 r ) − c (1 + 2 r) +
(
c + 2 r − 1 2
)√ 
2 c − r ( 2 − 5 r ) .15
Fig. 5. Capacity, expected output, and surplus for c = 1 / 32 . 
 
 on [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] ,
S¯ ( r, k ∗( r )) = 
r 3 
(
1 + 4 r 3 
)
+ 3 r 2 
(
c ( c − 2 r ( 1 − r ) ) − r 3 )− c 3
6 r 3 . 
on [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , and
S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) = 1 − 6 c 8 +
√ 
2 c 3 
2 . 
on [ ¯r ( c ) , 1] . When c ≥ 1/8, the interval [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] is empty.
Fig. 5 displays the equilibrium capacity, and the expected output and surplus as
functions of the price cap when the unit cost of capacity is c = 1 / 32 ; note that
maximum capacity is reached at a price cap-capacity pair in region A and, consistently
with Proposition 3 , the price cap that maximizes the expected surplus is below the price
cap that maximizes capacity, i.e., r W  .11 < r ∗  .17. The grey curves in this ﬁgure
provide graphs of these functions with a capacity payment z = 1 / 100 ; this small capac-
ity payment has a positive impact on surplus even though in this example the cost of
capacity is small.
Fig. 6 shows the corresponding graphs for c = 3 / 20; the maximum capacity is reached
at a price cap-capacity pair in region B , and consistently with Proposition 3 , the expected
surplus is maximal at this price cap. The grey curves in this ﬁgure provide graphs of
these functions with a capacity payment z = 1 / 100; consistently with Proposition 4 a
small capacity payments has a positive impact on the surplus.
It is interesting to observe that whether the cost of capacity is large or small, intro-
ducing a small capacity payment reduces the optimal price cap: having a complementary16
Fig. 6. Capacity, expected output, and surplus for c = 3 / 20 . 
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cnstrument to provide incentives for capacity investments allows a more eﬀective use of
he price cap to discourage capacity withholding.
Fig. 7 illustrates the eﬀectiveness of price caps as measured by the ratio S¯ ∗( c ) /
 
∗( k W ( c )), where S¯ ∗( c ) := S¯ ( r W ( c ) , k ∗( r W ( c ))) is the expected surplus with an optimal
rice cap, and S ∗( k W ( c )) is the maximum expected surplus that can be realized assum-
ng that the socially optimal capacity k W ( c ) is installed and supplied unconditionally. A
rice cap is very eﬀective when the unit cost of capacity is small, but its eﬀectiveness de-
reases as the unit cost of capacity increases. The graph k ∗( r W ( c ))/ k W ( c ) illustrates the
ﬀectiveness of a price cap to provide incentives for capacity investment. In the absence
f a binding price cap the monopoly installs k W ( c )/2 units of capacity, and the expected
urplus realized is 3 S ∗( k W ( c ))/4. Thus, the dashed lines at 1/2 and 3/4 in Fig. 7 describe,
espectively, the (constant) ratios of installed capacity to socially optimal capacity, and
xpected surplus realized to maximum expected surplus.
This example also illustrates the diﬀering eﬀects of price caps in our setting and in the
odel studied by Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and Zoettl (2010) , in which the monopoly
annot withhold capacity. Simple calculations show that when the monopoly cannot with-
old capacity the socially optimal price cap yields the level of capacity ˆ k ∗( c ) = k w ( c ) / 2 .
hus, a price cap is a p o or instrument to provide incentives for capacity investment
hen the monopoly cannot withhold capacity and, consequently, the expected surplus
ealized with a socially optimal price cap ˆ S ∗( c ) is well below the maximum expected
urplus S ∗( k w ( c )) . Moreover, as Fig. 7 shows the ratio ˆ S ∗( c ) /S ∗( k w ( c )) is uniformly be-
ow S¯ ∗( c ) /S ∗( k w ( c )) , and the diﬀerence between these ratios is considerably large for
mall values of the unit cost of capacity. (See Lemus and Moreno, 2015 , Appendix B,
or a treatment of this model and example.) These conclusions suggest that disallowing
apacity withholding may not be an advisable regulatory policy.17
Fig. 7. Price cap eﬀectiveness with and without capacity withholding. 7 App endix. Pro ofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the results described in Tables A –C we readily calculate the
monop oly’s exp ected marginal revenue as
M R ( r, k) =
∫ 1
r+ k 
rf ( x ) dx = r[1 − F ( r + k)] (3)
for ( r , k ) ∈ A ,
M R ( r, k) =
∫ r+ k
2 k 
( x − 2 k ) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r+ k 
rf ( x ) dx (4)
for ( r , k ) ∈ B , and
M R ( r, k) =
∫ 1
2 k 
( x − 2 k) f ( x ) dx (5)
for ( r , k ) ∈ C . Since (3) and (4) coincide for k = r, and (4) and (5) coincide for r > 1/2
and k = 1 − r, then M R is continuous on A ∪ B ∪ C .
Diﬀerentiating M R we get
∂ M R ( r, k)
∂k 
= −rf ( r + k) < 0 (6)
for ( r , k ) ∈ A ,
∂ M R ( r, k) = −k f ( r + k ) − 2 [ F ( r + k) − F (2 k) ] < 0 (7)
∂k 
18
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ior ( r , k ) ∈ B , and
∂ M R ( r, k)
∂k 
= −2 [ 1 − F (2 k) ] < 0 (8)
or ( r , k ) ∈ C . Moreover, since (6) and (7) coincide for k = r, then M R is diﬀerentiable
n A ∪ B ∪ C , except p erhaps in the b oundary of B . Hence the exp ected marginal revenue
unction M R is strictly decreasing, and therefore the monop oly’s exp ected revenue is a
trictly concave function on A ∪ B ∪ C . 
roof of Lemma 2. We calculate the equilibrium capacity k ∗( r ). The expected marginal
evenue when capacity is zero is
M R ( r, 0) =
∫ r
0 
xf ( x ) dx + r ( 1 − F ( r) ) .
ence d M R ( r, 0) /dr = 1 − F ( r) > 0 on (0, 1), and therefore the function M R ( ·, 0) has
n inverse, which we denote by r . For r ∈ [0 , r ( c )) we have M R ( r, 0) < c, and since
 R ( r, k) is decreasing in k , then M R ( r, k) < c for all k . Hence Π¯( r, ·) is decreasing, and
herefore k ∗( r) = 0 .
Let us consider price caps r ∈ [ r ( c ) , 1 / 2) . Then Π¯( r, ·) takes values in regions A and
 . Solving the Eq. (1) for M R given by (6) yields
k A ( r) = F −1 (1 − c 
r 
) − r.
ence
k A ( r) + r = F −1 (1 − c 
r 
) < 1 ,
nd therefore k A ( r) < 1 − r. In order for ( r , k A ( r )) ∈ A , we must have r ≤ k A ( r ). This
nequality is equivalent to
c ≤ M R ( r, r) = r ( 1 − F (2 r) ) .
Denote by k B ( r ) the solution to Eq. (1) for M R given by (4) . In order for ( r , k B ( r )) ∈
 , the inequalities 0 < k B ( r ) < r must hold. (Recall that we are identifying the monopoly
apacity for r < 1/2, and therefore k B ( r ) < r implies k B ( r) < 1 − r.) The inequality k B ( r )
 r is equivalent to c > M R ( r, r) . The inequality k B ( r ) > 0 is equivalent to c < M R ( r, 0) ,
.e., r ≥ r ( c ).
Let us now consider price caps r ∈ [1 / 2 , 1] . Then Π¯( r, ·) takes values in regions B and
 . If r < r ( c ), then k ∗( r) = 0 as shown above. For r ≥ r ( c ), Π¯( r, ·) reaches its maximum
n region B provided k B ( r) < 1 − r. This inequality is equivalent to
M R ( r, 1 − r) =
∫ 1
2 ( 1 −r ) 
xf ( x ) dx − 2 ( 1 − r ) [ 1 − F (2 ( 1 − r ) ) ] < c.19
 Note that
d M R ( r, 1 − r)
dr 
= 2(1 − F (2 ( 1 − r ) )) > 0 .
Hence the function M R ( r, 1 − r) has an inverse on (1/2, 1), which we denote by r¯ ( c ) ,
and therefore we may write the above inequality as r < r¯ ( c ) . Note that for r = 1 we
have M R ( r, 1 − r) = M R (1 , 0) = E ( X) . Hence, since c < E ( X) by assumption, we have
r¯ ( c ) < 1 . For r ∈ [ ¯r ( c ) , 1) , Π¯( r, ·) increases with k in region B and reaches its maximum
in region C . Denote by k C the solution to the condition (1) for M R given by Eq. (5) .
Clearly k C is independent of the price cap r . Also, since M R ( r, 1 / 2) = 0 , then k C <
1/2 for all c ∈ (0 , E ( X)) . Since the expected marginal revenue decreases with k , then
k C > 1 − r implies c < M R ( r, 1 − r) . Moreover, since r > 1/2 and M R is decreasing,
then M R ( r, 1 − r) < M R ( r, r) . Hence k C solves the monopoly problem if r ≥ r¯ ( c ) .
Assume that the hazard rate of X , h ( ·) = f ( ·) / [1 − F ( ·)] , is increasing. Diﬀerentiating
yields
d M R ( r, r)
dr 
= ( 1 − F (2 r) ) − 2 r f (2 r ) = ( 1 − F (2 r) ) ( 1 − 2 r h (2 r ) ) ,
which is positive for values of r close to zero and negative for values of r close to 1/2.
Since h is increasing, then the function M R ( r, r) is strictly concave and reaches its
maximum value M ∗ on (0, 1/2). If c < M ∗, then the equation M R ( r, r) = c has two
solutions on (0, 1/2), which we denote by r −( c ) and r + ( c ) with r −( c ) < r + ( c ) . Thus, for
r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , we have c ≤ M R ( r, r) , and hence k ∗( r) = k ∗A ( r) . Since c < r ( c ) and
1 / 2 < r¯ ( c ) < 1 , then for c < M ∗, c < r ( c ) < r −( c ) < r + ( c ) < 1 / 2 < r¯ ( c ) < 1 . 
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 3. Let g be a real valued function on R , diﬀerentiable on some interval ( a , b ),
and satisfying g ′ ( a ) > 0 > g ′ ( b ), and g ′ ′ ( y ) < 0 for all y ∈ ( a , b ) such that g ′ ( y) = 0 . Then
g has a unique global maximizer on [a , b] , y ∗ ∈ (a , b), and g ′ is positive on (a , y ∗) and
negative on (y ∗, b) .
Proof. Let y ∗ = sup { y ∈ ( a, b ) | g ′ ( y) > 0 } and y ∗∗ = inf { y ∈ ( a, b ) | g ′ ( y) < 0 } . Since
g ′ is continuous on ( a , b ), then g ′ ( y ∗) = g ′ ( y ∗∗) = 0 , and therefore a < y ∗∗ ≤ y ∗ < b .
We show that y ∗ = y ∗∗, which establishes the lemma. Suppose by way of contradiction
that y ∗∗ < y ∗. Since both g ′ ′ ( y ∗) and g ′ ′ ( y ∗∗) are negative, then for ε ∈ (0 , y ∗ − y ∗∗) suf-
ﬁciently small
g ′ ( y ∗∗ + ε ) < 0 < g ′ ( y ∗ − ε ) .
Hence g ′ ( ¯y ) = 0 for some y¯ ∈ ( y ∗∗ − ε, y ∗ + ε ) , and g ′ is negative (positive) for y below
(above) and near y¯ . Hence g ′′ ( ¯y ) > 0 , which is a contradiction. 20
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Aroof of Proposition 1. Let r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) . Since the expected marginal revenue
 R ( r, k) is diﬀerentiable in regions A ∪ B , we can diﬀerentiate Eq. (1) to get
∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂k 
dk + ∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂r 
dr = 0 .
nd since M R is decreasing, i.e., ∂ M R ( r, k) /∂k < 0 , then
dk ∗
dr 
= −∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂r 
(
∂ M R ( r, k)
∂k 
)−1
, 
nd
dk ∗
dr 
 0 ⇔ ∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂r 
 0 .
ince f is diﬀerentiable, then M R is twice diﬀerentiable, and
d 2 k ∗
dr 2
= −
(
∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂k 
)−1 
d
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
+ ∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂r 
(
∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂k 
)−2 
d
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂k 
)
= −
(
∂ M R ( r, k) 
∂k 
)−1 (
d
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
+ dk
∗
dr 
d 
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂k 
))
. 
ence, for r such that dk ∗/dr = 0 , we have
d 2 k ∗
dr 2 
 0 ⇔ d
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
 0 .
If ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ A , then diﬀerentiating M R given in (3) yields
∂ M R ( r, k)
∂r 
= 1 − F ( r + k) − rf ( r + k) = ( 1 − F ( r + k) ) ( 1 − rh ( r + k ) ) ,
nd
d 
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
= −f ( r + k)
(
1 + dk A
dr 
)
( 1 − rh ( r + k ) )
− ( 1 − F ( r + k) ) ( h ( r + k ) + rh ′ ( r + k ) )
(
1 + dk A
dr 
)
. 
ssume that dk A /dr = 0 . Then 1 − rh ( r + k ∗( r) ) = 0 , and
d 
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r)) 
∂r 
)
= −( 1 − F ( r + k ∗( r)) ) ( h ( r + k ∗( r) ) + rh ′ ( r + k ∗( r) ) ) .21
If the hazard rate is increasing (i.e., h ′ > 0), then we have d 2 k A / dr 2 < 0, and therefore
every critical point of k A is a local maximum.
If ( r , k B ( r )) ∈ B , then diﬀerentiating M R given in (4) yields
∂ M R ( r, k)
∂r 
= 1 − F ( r + k) − kf ( r + k) = ( 1 − F ( r + k) ) ( 1 − kh ( r + k) ) ,
and
d 
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
= −f ( r + k ∗( r)) ( 1 − k ∗( r) h ( r + k ∗( r)) )
(
1 + dk B
dr 
)
− ( 1 − F ( r + k ∗( r)) ) k ∗( r) h ′ ( r + k ∗( r))
(
1 + dk B
dr 
)
− ( 1 − F ( r + k ∗( r)) ) h ( r + k ∗( r)) dk B 
dr 
. 
Assume that dk B /dr = 0 . Then 1 − k ∗( r) h ( r + k ∗( r) ) = 0 , and
d 
dr 
(
∂ M R ( r, k ∗( r))
∂r 
)
= −( 1 − F ( r + k ∗( r)) ) k ∗( r) h ′ ( r + k ∗( r)) .
If the hazard rate is increasing (i.e., h ′ > 0) we have d 2 k B / dr 2 < 0, and therefore every
critical point of k B is a local maximum.
Thus, for r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) , d 2 k ∗( r )/ dr 2 < 0 whenever dk ∗( r) /dr = 0 . Moreover, since
k B ( ¯r ( c )) = 1 − r¯ ( c ) , and
∂ M R ( r, 1 − r) 
∂r 
∣∣∣∣
r= ¯r ( c ) 
= 1 − F ( ¯r ( c ) + ( 1 − r¯ ( c ) ) ) − ( 1 − r¯ ( c ) ) f ( ¯r ( c ) + ( 1 − r¯ ( c ) ) )
= −( 1 − r¯ ( c ) ) f (1) < 0 ,
then dk B ( ¯r ( c )) /dr < 0 . And since k B ( r ( c )) = 0 , and
∂ M R ( r, 0) 
∂r 
∣∣∣∣
r= r ( c ) 
= 1 − F ( r ( c )) > 0 ,
then dk B ( r ( c ))/ dr > 0. Hence k ∗ has a global maximum at some r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c ) ) , and
satisﬁes dk ∗/ dr > 0 on ( r ( c ), r ∗( c )) and dk ∗/ dr < 0 on ( r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )) by Lemma 3 . Since
k ∗ is continuous on [0, 1], is equal to zero on [0, r ( c ))) and is equal to k C on [ ¯r ( c ) , 1) ,
this implies that k ∗ is quasi-concave, i.e., single peak, on [0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The expected output is
E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X) =
∫ 2 r 
0 
x 
2 f ( x ) dx +
∫ r + k ∗( r )
2 r 
( x − r) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
k ∗( r) f ( x ) dx,22
ff
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f
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f
c
a
Aor r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , and
E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X) =
∫ 2 k ∗( r) 
0 
x 
2 f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
2 k ∗( r) 
k ∗( r) f ( x ) dx
or r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] . Hence
d E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
= −[F ( r + k ∗( r)) − F (2 r)] + dk
∗
dr 
( 1 − F ( r + k ∗( r)) )
or r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , and
d E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
= dk
∗
dr 
( 1 − F (2 k ∗( r)) )
or r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] . Thus,
dk ∗
dr 
≤ 0 ⇒ d E ( Q ( r, k 
∗( r) , X)
dr 
< 0
or r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , that is, the expected output decreases with the price cap beyond
he price cap that maximizes capacity, and therefore the price cap that maximizes output
s below r ∗( c ). Moreover,
d E ( Q ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
 0 ⇔ dk
∗
dr 
 0 .
or r ∈ [ r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , that is, the expected output increases with the price
ap for r ∈ ( r ( c ), r ∗( c )), and decreases for r ∈ ( r ∗( c ) , ¯r ( c )) .
Likewise for r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the expected price is
E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X) =
∫ 2 r 
0 
x 
2 f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
2 r 
rf ( x ) dx,
nd for r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] it is
E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X) =
∫ 2 k ∗( r) 
0 
x 
2 f ( x ) dx +
∫ r + k ∗( r )
2 k ∗( r) 
( x − k ∗( r)) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
rf ( x ) dx.
Hence, for r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )]
d E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X)
dr 
= 1 − F (2 r) > 0 .
lso, for r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] ,
d E ( P ( r, k ∗( r) , X) = −dk
∗
[F ( r + k ∗( r)) − F (2 k ∗( r))] + [1 − F ( r + k ∗( r))] ,dr dr 
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Table 3A 
Gross surplus in region A . 
X [0, 2 r ) [2 r, r + k) [ r + k, 1] 
S ( r , k , x ) 3 8 x 
2 1 
2 ( x 
2 − r 2 ) 1 2 ( 2 x − k ) k
Table 3BC 
Gross surplus in regions B and C . 
X [0, 2 k ) [2 k , 1] 
S ( r , k , x ) 3 8 x 
2 1 
2 ( 2 x − k ) kand therefore
dk ∗
dr 
≤ 0 ⇒ d E ( P ( r, k 
∗( r) , X)
dr 
> 0 .

Pro of of Prop osition 3. Tables 3A and 3BC describe the function S for ( r, k) in A and
B ∪ C, respectively.
The expected gross surplus is
E ( S( r, k, X)) = 38
∫ 2 r
0 
x 2 f ( x ) dx + 12
∫ r+ k
2 r 
( x 2 − r 2 ) f ( x ) dx (9)
+ 12
∫ 1
r+ k 
(2 x − k ) k f ( x ) dx.
for ( r , k ) ∈ A , and is
E ( S( r, k, X)) = 38
∫ 2 k
0 
x 2 f ( x ) dx + 12
∫ 1
2 k 
( 2 x − k ) kf ( x ) dx. (10)
for ( r , k ) ∈ B ∪ C . For r ∈ [0 , 1] the net surplus is S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) = E ( S( r, k ∗( r) , X)) − ck ∗( r) .
For price caps r ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] the price cap-equilibrium capacity pair ( r , k ∗( r )) is in
region A . Diﬀerentiating S¯ given in (9) yields
d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r))
dr 
= dk 
∗( r)
dr 
( ∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
( x − k ∗( r)) f ( x ) dx − c
)
− r[F ( r + k ∗( r) ) − F ( 2 r ) ] ,
Recall that r ∗( c ) is the capacity maximizing price cap identiﬁed in Proposition 1 . If
r ∗( c ) ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then dk ∗( r ∗( c )) /dr = 0 and k ∗( r ∗( c )) = k A ( r ∗( c )) > r ∗( c ) imply
d ¯S ( r ∗( c ) , k ∗( r ∗( c )))
dr 
= −r ∗( c )[F ( r ∗( c ) + k ∗( r ∗( c )) ) − F ( 2 r ∗( c ) ) ] < 0 .
Hence the optimal price cap is below r ∗( c ).24
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PFor r ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] we have ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ B ∪ C . Diﬀerentiating S¯ given
n (10) yields
d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r))
dr 
= dk 
∗( r)
dr 
( ∫ 1
2 k ∗( r) 
( x − k ∗( r)) f ( x ) dx − c
)
. 
ince ( r , k ∗( r )) ∈ B , then k ∗( r ) < r , and
M R ( r, k ∗( r)) =
∫ r + k ∗( r )
2 k ∗( r) 
( x − 2 k ∗( r) ) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
rf ( x ) dx = c.
ence
∫ 1
2 k ∗( r) 
( x − k ∗( r)) f ( x ) dx − c
=
∫ r + k ∗( r )
2 k ∗( r) 
k ∗( r) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r + k ∗( r ) 
( x − k ∗( r) − r) f ( x ) dx > 0 ,
nd therefore
d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r))
dr 
= 0 ⇔ dk 
∗( r)
dr 
= 0 .
iﬀerentiating d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r )) /dr we get
d 2 S¯ ( r, k ∗( r))
dr 2
= d 
2 k ∗( r)
dr 2 
( ∫ 1
2 k ∗( r) 
( x − k ∗( r)) f ( x ) dx − c
)
−
(
dk ∗( r)
dr 
)2
[ 1 − F (2 k ∗( r)) ] − 2 k ∗( r) f (2 k ∗( r)) .
f d ¯S ( r, k ∗( r)) /dr = 0 , then dk ∗( r) /dr = 0 , which as shown above implies d 2 k ∗( r )/ dr 2 <
. Hence d 2 S¯ ( r, k ∗( r )) /dr 2 < 0 . Thus, by Lemma 3 if r ∗( c ) ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] ,
hen r ∗( c ) is the unique global maximizer of S¯ ( r, k ∗( r)) on ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) . 
roof of Proposition 4. By the Envelope Theorem
d ˜  S ( ˜  r∗( z ) , z )
dz 
= ∂E ( S( r, k, X))
∂r 
dr ∗
dz 
+
(
∂E ( S( r, k, X))
∂k 
− c
)(
∂ ˜  k ∗
∂r 
dr ∗
dz 
+ ∂ ˜
 k∗
∂z 
)
=
(
∂E ( S( r, k, X))
∂k 
− c
)(
∂ ˜  k ∗
∂r 
dr ∗
dz 
+ ∂ ˜
 k∗
∂z 
)
. 25
Moreover, when the cost of capacity is suﬃciently large that ( ˜  r∗( z) , ˜  k ∗( ˜  r∗( z) , z)) ∈ B,
then ˜ r∗( z) maximizes ˜ k ∗( r, z) as well, and therefore the Envelope Theorem also implies
d ˜  S ( ˜  r∗( z ) , z )
dz 
=
(
∂E ( S( r, k, X))
∂k 
− c
)
∂ ˜  k ∗
∂z 
. 
We show that k W > k ∗( ˜  r∗( z)) ≥ k ∗( r ∗( c )) for all r ∈ [0 , 1] . Let us ﬁx c and reduce
notation by writing k ∗ and r ∗ for k ∗( r ∗( c )) and r ∗( c ), respectively. Diﬀerentiating S ∗ we
get
dS ∗( k) 
dk 
∣∣∣∣
k = k ∗
=
∫ 1
k ∗
( x − k ∗) f ( x ) dx − c.
If r ∗ ∈ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then k ∗ solves
M R ( r ∗, k ∗) =
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
r ∗f ( x ) dx = c,
and therefore
dS ∗( k) 
dk 
∣∣∣∣
k = k ∗
=
∫ 1
k ∗
( x − k ∗) f ( x ) dx −
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
r ∗f ( x ) dx
=
∫ r ∗+ k ∗
k ∗
( x − k ∗) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
( x − r ∗ − k ∗) f ( x ) dx > 0 .
If r ∗ ∈ ( r ( c ) , ¯r ( c )) \ [r −( c ) , r + ( c )] , then k ∗ ≤ r ∗ solves
M R ( r ∗, k ∗) =
∫ r ∗+ k ∗
2 k ∗
( x − 2 k ∗) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
r ∗f ( x ) dx = c,
and therefore
dS ∗( k) 
dk 
∣∣∣∣
k = k ∗
=
∫ 1
k ∗
( x − k ∗) f ( x ) dx −
( ∫ r ∗+ k ∗
2 k ∗
( x − 2 k ∗) f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
rf ( x ) dx
)
=
∫ 2 k ∗
k ∗
( x − k ∗) f ( x ) dx
+
∫ r ∗+ k ∗
2 k ∗
k ∗f ( x ) dx +
∫ 1
r ∗+ k ∗
( x − r ∗ − k ∗) f ( x ) dx > 0 .
Hence k ∗ < k W in either case.
Assume that ( ˜  r∗(0) , ˜  k ∗( ˜  r∗(0) , 0)) ∈ B. Diﬀerentiating the equation M R ( r, k) = c − z
and noticing Eqs. (6) and (7) we get
∂ ˜  k ∗ = −∂ M R ( r, k) > 0 .
∂z ∂k 
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C  
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D
E  
G  
G  
G  
J  
J  
J  
L  lso
∂E ( S( r, k, X))
∂k 
=
∫ 1
2 k 
( x − k) f ( x ) dx
> 
∫ r+ k
2 k 
( x − 2 k) f ( x ) +
∫ 1
r+ k 
rf ( x ) dx
= M R ( r, k)
or ( r , k ) ∈ B . Since M R ( ˜  r∗( z) , ˜  k ∗( ˜  r∗( z) , z)) = c − z, then
∂E ( S( r, k, X)) 
∂k 
∣∣∣∣
( r,k )=( ˜  r∗(0) , ˜  k ∗( ˜  r∗(0) , 0)) 
> c. 
herefore
d ˜  S ( ˜  r∗( z ) , z ) 
dz 
∣∣∣∣
z=0 
> 0 .
upplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version,
t 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.005
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